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“Children are Different”:  
Constitutional Values and Justice Policy 
 
 
Elizabeth S. Scott∗ 
 
This essay explores the importance for Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and for juvenile crime regulation of Miller v. Alabama 
(2012) and two earlier Supreme Court opinions rejecting harsh 
sentences for juveniles.  It argues that the Court has broken new ground 
in defining juveniles as a category of offenders who are subject to special 
Eighth Amendment protections.  In Miller and in Graham v. Florida 
(2010) particularly, the Court has applied to juveniles’ non-capital 
sentences the rigorous proportionality review that, for adults, has been 
reserved for death sentences.  The essay then turns to the implications of 
the opinions for juvenile crime policy, arguing that the Court has 
embraced a developmental model of youth crime regulation and elevated 
this approach to one that is grounded in constitutional values and 
principles.  This approach represents a forceful repudiation of the 
punitive law reforms of the late twentieth century, when the relevance of 
adolescents’ developmental immaturity to justice policy was either 
ignored or rejected.  The opinions offer four key lessons for lawmakers.  
The first is that juvenile offenders are different from and less culpable 
than adults and should usually be subject to more lenient criminal 
sanctions.  The second lesson is that decisions to subject juveniles to 
adult prosecution and punishment should be “unusual” and 
individualized—made by a judge in a transfer hearing and not  through 
categorical legislative waiver.  The third lesson is that sanctions should 
focus on maximizing young offenders’ potential for reform.  The final 
lesson is that developmental science can guide and inform juvenile crime 
regulation in useful ways.  These four lessons, formulated by our 
preeminent legal institution and embodying constitutional values, are 
likely to have a profound influence on the future direction of youth crime 
regulation. 
  
                                                                                                                            
∗   Harold R. Medina Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  Many thanks to Joshua 
Dressler, Henry Monaghan, Robert Schwartz, Laurence Steinberg and participants at a workshop at 
Columbia Law School for helpful comments on this essay.  Thanks also to Annie Steinberg, who 
provided excellent research assistance. 
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Three times in the past seven years the Supreme Court has held that imposing 
harsh criminal sentences on juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  Most recently, Miller v. Alabama1 
(2012) prohibited the mandatory imposition of the sentence of life without parole 
[LWOP] on a juvenile convicted of homicide.  This opinion followed Roper v. 
Simmons2 (2005), in which the Court rejected the imposition of the death penalty 
for a crime committed by a juvenile, and Graham v. Florida3 (2010), holding that 
no minor could be sentenced to LWOP for a nonhomicide offense.  In these 
opinions, the Court has broken new ground in Eighth Amendment doctrine, 
creating a special status for juvenile offenders.  Just as importantly, the Court’s 
constitutional approach to these sentencing challenges powerfully reinforces an 
emerging regulatory approach to juvenile criminal activity and promises to 
influence its future direction.  With increasing clarity, the Court has announced a 
broad principle grounded in developmental knowledge that “children are 
different”4 from adult offenders and that these differences are important to the 
law’s response to youthful criminal conduct.  To be sure, the Court’s description of 
adolescent offenders as “children” exaggerates their immaturity in ways that may 
generate resistance.5  Nonetheless, this powerful statement represents a sound 
repudiation of distorted stereotypes of young criminals that dominated in the 1990s 
and implicitly challenges the punitive laws adopted during that period as offensive 
to constitutional values.  
The Eighth Amendment opinions offer two consistent messages—that 
juveniles who commit offenses are less culpable than their adult counterparts and 
that they are more likely to reform.  These conclusions are based on a 
proportionality analysis that draws on behavioral and neurobiological research to 
delineate the attributes of adolescence that distinguish teenage offending from 
adult criminal activity: these traits include adolescents’ propensity for taking risks 
without considering future consequences; their vulnerability to external influences, 
particularly of peers; and their unformed characters.6  The transient nature of these 
developmental influences is also important, because it suggests that juveniles are 
                                                                                                                            
1   132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
2   543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
3   130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
4   Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470. 
5   Both the majority and the dissent in the juvenile opinions assume that adolescents must be 
classified either as children or as fully responsible adults.  More accurately, young offenders belong 
in an intermediate category of individuals who are less culpable than their adult counterparts, but who 
bear responsibility for their offenses.  See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 123–39 (2008).  Although the Court clearly understands the nature and extent of 
the developmental differences between adolescent and adult offenders, its description of young 
offenders as “children” perpetuates a rhetorical mischaracterization that has had a polarizing effect on 
public discourse, generating outrage among hard-line critics.  Id. at 120–23.    
6   See infra Part I.D. 
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likely to desist from involvement in criminal activity as they mature; thus they are 
less likely than their adult counterparts to be “incorrigible” criminals.  This 
scientific evidence, in the Court’s view, creates a sound foundation for its new 
principle.  This principle is now embedded in Eighth Amendment doctrine and will 
inevitably be invoked in future constitutional challenges to criminal punishment of 
juveniles.   
The Court has created a special status for juveniles through doctrinal moves 
that had little precedent in its earlier Eighth Amendment cases.  In its willingness 
to find severe adult sentences to be excessive for juveniles, the Court elevated the 
prominence of proportionality, setting aside the deference to legislatures that is a 
strong theme in modern Eighth Amendment law and molding constitutional 
doctrine in a new direction.  First, the Court applied to the non-capital sentence of 
LWOP the rigorous proportionality review previously reserved for the death 
penalty, categorically prohibiting the sentence for nonhomicide offenses7 and 
mandating an individualized hearing before it could be imposed for homicide.8  
Moreover, its judgment that LWOP was unconstitutionally harsh as applied to 
juveniles was not based on substantial evidence of a national consensus supporting 
this conclusion—the objective measure that aims to preserve legislative 
prerogative even in death penalty cases.9  Instead, the Court relied almost 
exclusively on its developmentally-informed proportionality analysis, brushing 
aside the complaint by the dissenting Justices in Graham and Miller that many 
state statutes authorized the contested sentences.10  
                                                                                                                            
7   The Court has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for offenses other than 
intentional killing and for certain categories of offenders, such as mentally retarded offenders and 
juveniles.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the death penalty as punishment for the rape of a child); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002) (holding that execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment);  
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty was grossly disproportionate 
to the crime of rape).  
8   Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting 
mandatory imposition of death penalty and requiring that defendant be evaluated individually, 
including evaluating mitigating factors).  In evaluating whether non-capital adult sentences are 
excessive, the Court has required “gross disproportionality,” a standard adopted from Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).  See, e.g., 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (“The proportionality principles in our cases distilled in 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence guide our application of the Eighth Amendment . . . .”).  The gross 
disproportionality standard is almost never met.  See, e.g., id. at 30 (life sentence under three strikes 
statute for third felony involving theft of a golf club is not grossly disproportionate); Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).  The Court before Miller held that the prohibition of a mandatory 
sentence only applied to the death penalty and not to non-capital sentences.  See Harmelin, 501 U.S. 
at 1006.   
9   The Court has emphasized the need to review legislative enactments and jury sentencing 
outcomes as “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.”  Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 181 (1976); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324. 
10  See infra Part I.D. 
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Despite the Court’s emphatic announcement that “children are different” from 
adults, it is hard to predict future developments in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence as applied to juveniles.  But youth advocates will find reasons for 
optimism in the Court’s strong endorsement in Miller of the importance of 
considering youth and immaturity in sentencing decisions involving juveniles.  Its 
seemingly gratuitous admonishment that sentences of LWOP should be 
“uncommon”11 and rarely imposed may ultimately result in the categorical 
abolition of this sentence for juveniles, as Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Thomas and Alito predict in dissenting opinions.12  Just as intriguing, and with 
more far reaching implications, is the Court’s insistence that the features of 
adolescence that reduce the culpability of young offenders are not crime specific—
that they were as relevant to homicide in Miller as to nonhomicide offenses in 
Graham.13  Implicit in this generalization is a broader principle that the same 
attributes of adolescence that mitigate the culpability of the youths whose crimes 
the Court has reviewed reduce the blameworthiness of juveniles’ criminal choices 
generally.  
Whether the Court will apply this broader principle as a constitutional 
restraint on the sentencing of juveniles is uncertain; but even if the Court extends 
Miller no further, the policy ramifications of these opinions are likely to prove 
substantial.  The decisions embody a set of constitutional values mandating fair 
treatment of young offenders.  They also draw on an understanding of juvenile 
crime and of the justice system’s appropriate response that offers several key 
lessons for lawmakers: that juvenile offenders are different from and less culpable 
than adults and should usually be subject to different treatment; that decisions to 
subject juveniles to adult prosecution and punishment should be “unusual” and 
individualized; that sanctions should focus on maximizing young offenders’ 
potential for reform; and that developmental science can inform juvenile crime 
regulation in useful ways.14 These four lessons, formulated by our preeminent legal 
institution, are likely to have a profound influence on the future direction of youth 
crime regulation. 
Lawmakers today are rethinking punitive policies that were adopted in a 
climate of fear and hostility toward juvenile offenders in the late twentieth 
century.15 This new wave of reform recognizes that retaining juveniles in a 
separate system where they receive developmentally appropriate dispositions is 
more likely to promote both fairness and efficient crime reduction than policies 
                                                                                                                            
11  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).  
12  In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts speculates, “the Court’s gratuitous prediction [that 
LWOP for juveniles should be uncommon] appears to be nothing other than an invitation to overturn 
life without parole sentences . . . .”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
13  Id. at 2465 (majority opinion). 
14  See discussion of these lessons, infra Part II.B.  
15  See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 94–117 (2008) (describing moral panics of the 
1990s and their impact on law reform).   
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that ignore differences between juveniles and adults.16  The recent Supreme Court 
opinions reinforce this developmental approach and elevate its stature to one 
grounded in constitutional principle—a message that is likely to resonate 
powerfully with policymakers.  Following a long period in which the relevance to 
criminal punishment of differences between juvenile and adult offenders was either 
ignored or denied, the recent Supreme Court opinions signal forcefully that 
policies that ignore these differences offend constitutional values. 
The essay will proceed in two parts.  Part I will focus on Miller and the earlier 
juvenile sentencing opinions, arguing that the Court has indeed created a special 
status for juvenile offenders in Eighth Amendment doctrine.  Part II will explore 
the implications for juvenile crime regulation of these opinions, setting the 
opinions in the political and legal context of late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century juvenile crime regulation and then exploring the lessons the opinions offer 
for lawmakers.  
 
I. CREATING A SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
 
At first blush, Miller v. Alabama appears to be a narrow decision, simply 
establishing a procedural requirement before juveniles can be sentenced to LWOP.  
But this Part shows that such a reading is misleading and that Miller is at least as 
important as the Court’s earlier opinions in creating a special status for juvenile 
offenders under the Eighth Amendment.  In combination with Graham, Miller 
represents an important extension of Eighth Amendment doctrine into new 
territory.  The Court applied safeguards against excessive punishment of juveniles 
that are far more rigorous than those it has applied to the sentencing of adults even 
(arguably) in the death penalty context.17  Moreover, the constitutional principle 
announced in Miller—“children are different”—is likely to have a far reaching 
impact beyond the decision’s modest holding. 
The two cases that were joined in Miller18 presented the Court with several 
options aside from simply upholding the petitioners’ sentences or rejecting LWOP 
for juveniles altogether.  Both petitioners were fourteen years old at the time they 
committed their crimes, so the Court might have found LWOP to be cruel and 
unusual punishment as applied to younger juveniles.19 This was the approach that 
the Court adopted when it first considered a challenge to the juvenile death penalty 
in the 1980s.  In two opinions, the Court found the death penalty unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                            
16  See generally id. at 226–29.  
17  See infra notes 63–70 (discussing Graham and Miller’s seeming abandonment of the 
objective measure of excessive punishment under the “evolving standard of decency” test). 
18  The two state court cases were Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011) and Miller 
v. State, 63 So.3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).  
19  In their brief, Petitioners argue that the Court could “discern a satisfactory basis for 
[prohibiting LWOP for juveniles below] one of several different ages” above the age of fourteen.  
Brief for Petitioner at 61, Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647).  
76 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 11:1 
 
 
under the Eighth Amendment as applied to fifteen-year-old offenders,20 but not as 
applied to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.21 Alternatively, the Court might have 
prohibited the sentence of LWOP for youths who did not intend to kill.  Kuntrell 
Jackson, whose case was joined with that of Evan Miller, was not the trigger man 
in the video store hold up that resulted in the clerk’s death.  He stood outside as the 
crime unfolded and there was no evidence that he intended to kill the victim.22  
Justice Breyer in concurrence would have prohibited the sentence of LWOP 
without evidence of such intent,23 but the majority did not base its holding on this 
distinction.  Instead, the Court focused on the mandatory nature of the sentence.  
Both the Alabama and Arkansas statutes required the sentencing court to impose 
LWOP on defendants convicted of murder.  The Court held that this harsh sentence 
could only be imposed on a juvenile after the youth had the opportunity to produce 
evidence of mitigation.24  
Because its holding was limited to this procedural requirement, Miller appears 
more modest in its reach than the two earlier juvenile sentencing decisions.  In 
Roper, the Court categorically rejected the death penalty as unconstitutionally 
excessive punishment for a crime committed by a juvenile.  Graham followed suit 
by holding that no minor could be sentenced to LWOP for a nonhomicide offense.  
Miller, in contrast, simply prohibited a mandatory sentence of LWOP for 
homicide, requiring an individualized inquiry as to whether the sentence is 
appropriate.  In theory, every youth charged with homicide in a state in which the 
sentence is authorized (including Kuntrell Jackson) could receive LWOP after the 
required hearing. 
Nonetheless, for several reasons, Miller is a far more powerful statement of 
how juveniles should be dealt with in the justice system than its narrow holding 
might suggest.  First, in strong language, the Court made clear that it expected the 
                                                                                                                            
20  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits execution of defendant convicted of committing murder when he was fifteen years old).  
21  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (execution for crimes committed by 
sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds does not violate Eighth Amendment).  
22  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012) (describing Jackson’s offense).  Miller in 
contrast intentionally killed the victim of his homicide, repeatedly hitting him with a baseball bat, and 
saying, at one point, “I am God, I’ve come to take your life.”  Id. at 2462.  
23  Id. at 2475–77 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer’s position was a natural extension of 
the Graham analysis, in which the Court (and Justice Roberts in concurrence) emphasized that the 
juvenile who did not intend to kill was less culpable than one who did.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
was also consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Enmund v. Florida in which the Court rejected the 
death penalty for defendants convicted of felony murder who neither killed nor intended to kill the 
victim.  458 U.S. 782 (1982).   
24  The Court does not clarify whether a separate hearing is required before LWOP can be 
imposed, as it would be in the death penalty setting, in which defendant can introduce mitigating 
evidence.  See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).  It is possible that the 
defendant’s ability to contribute mitigating evidence to be incorporated into the probation report 
might be deemed sufficient.     
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sentence of LWOP to be “uncommon”;25 only the rare juvenile will deserve this 
sentence.  The dissenters recognized that this stern admonition potentially might 
become a self-fulfilling prophesy.26  Second, Miller made explicit a theme that the 
Court began to develop in Graham—that juveniles represent a special category for 
Eighth Amendment purposes.  In evaluating whether LWOP for juveniles violates 
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”27 
the Court applied to juveniles facing LWOP what might be called “proportionality 
analysis with teeth,” previously reserved for the review of death sentences.  
Moreover, the Court in Graham and Miller found the challenged sentence to be 
constitutionality deficient even without a demonstration that it objectively violated  
national sentencing norms—a measure required (at least ostensibly) even in death 
penalty cases.28  Indeed, as the dissenters argued, it would be difficult to argue that 
statutes imposing mandatory LWOP on juvenile murderers violated these objective 
norms, given that such statutes were in force in twenty-nine states prior to Miller.29  
To an extraordinary extent, the Court relied on its own developmentally-based 
proportionality analysis in concluding that the sentence was excessive.  I will argue 
that, notwithstanding the dissenting Justices’ protests, this analysis provided a 
solid and objective basis for the Court’s conclusion that LWOP is an excessive 
sentence because of juveniles’ reduced culpability.  Finally, Miller is important 
because its proportionality analysis supports a general mitigation principle to be 
applied to adolescent criminal choices, with implications extending far beyond the 
sentence of LWOP.    
 
A. LWOP: An “Uncommon” Sentence   
 
The Court in Miller appears to have been somewhat conflicted about the reach 
of the opinion.  On the one hand, the majority emphasized that it was only creating 
a procedural requirement that must precede the imposition of LWOP on a 
juvenile—allowing the youth to introduce mitigating evidence of immaturity; a 
                                                                                                                            
25  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (“But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision 
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”). 
26  Justice Thomas argues in his dissent that the Court’s decision “may well cause trial judges 
to shy away from imposing life without parole sentences and embolden appellate judges to set them 
aside when they are imposed.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
27  In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion), Chief Justice Warren 
defined the standard for determining a punishment is “cruel” under the Eighth Amendment.  Because 
the words “cruel” and “unusual” from the Amendment are “not precise” and  “their scope is not 
static”, Chief Justice Warren concluded that the Amendment “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing society.”   
28  Id.; See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 451 (2002) (standard applied to find use of death 
penalty for retarded persons unconstitutional).  
29  Miller challenged the statutes of twenty-nine states that imposed mandatory LWOP for 
defendants convicted of murder.  132 S. Ct. at 2478 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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mature and particularly culpable youth could be sentenced to LWOP.30  Perhaps 
even more suggestive of a modest aim, the Court declined to apply the logic of 
Graham to Jackson’s felony murder.  In prohibiting LWOP for nonhomicide 
offenses, Graham emphasized the reduced culpability of young offenders whose 
crimes involved no intent to kill another person.31 But Miller does not hold that 
LWOP would always be inappropriate for the youth convicted of felony murder 
absent proof of an intent to kill the victim.    
The Court complicated Miller’s modest ambition, however, by emphatically 
(and gratuitously, a critic might say) underscoring that it expected the sentence of 
LWOP to be “uncommon” given the diminished culpability of youth.  The Court 
repeated its earlier admonition in Roper and Graham that it was extraordinarily 
difficult to distinguish in adolescence the youth whose crime was a product of 
“transient immaturity” from the “rare juvenile” whose crime reflects “irreparable 
corruption.”32  This difficulty, and the resulting risk that some immature youths 
might receive harsh sentences, justified categorical bans in the earlier opinions—
even as the Court acknowledged that some (unusual) youths might deserve the 
proscribed sentences.33  In Miller, the possibility of error led the Court to issue a 
stern warning to sentencing courts and juries that LWOP was constitutionally 
permissible only in unusual cases of mature and culpable juveniles, implying that 
more frequent use would be unacceptable.34  
The implications of this warning were not lost on the dissenting Justices.  
Chief Justice Roberts noted correctly that “uncommon” is a synonym for 
“unusual” in Eighth Amendment parlance; he predicted that the next step would be 
a categorical bar of the sentence of LWOP for juveniles.35  Justice Thomas pointed 
out that sentencers and reviewing courts were likely to take the Court’s warning to 
heart and refuse to impose LWOP on juveniles convicted of homicide.  The 
resulting infrequency of this sentence might ultimately become the basis for a 
future categorical ban.36  This scenario is plausible, although the Court’s warning 
                                                                                                                            
30  Thus the Court deflected the criticism of Justice Alito, who, in dissent, challenged the 
holding by offering the case of a seventeen and a half year old who bombed a mall, killing several 
people.  Id. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Justice Kagan responded that under the required 
procedure, this juvenile might well receive a sentence of LWOP.  Id. at 2469 n.8 (majority opinion). 
31  The Court in Graham noted, “. . . when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender 
who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”  Graham v. Florida, 130  
S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). 
32  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
33  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (quoted in 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).  
34  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  A student author argues (sensibly) that the Court’s presumption 
that the vast majority of juvenile offenders are immature justifies shifting the burden of proof, 
requiring the state to demonstrate the absence of diminished culpability.  The Supreme Court, 2011 
Term—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 176, 286 (2012).  
35  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
36  Id. at 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting)  
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will only have the influence that the dissenters feared if lawmakers embrace the 
broader lessons for juvenile crime regulation embodied in these opinions—a 
subject to which I will return. 
 
B. Expanding the Eighth Amendment Boundary 
 
1. A Proportionality Analysis “with Teeth”  
 
 Miller is an important case because it makes explicit a theme that the Court 
began to develop in Graham: that juveniles represent a very special category for 
Eighth Amendment purposes.  They are a class of offenders who are entitled to 
protections when they face a sentence of LWOP that adults receive only when 
facing a death sentence.  In rejecting the mandatory imposition of LWOP and 
finding it to be a presumptively excessive punishment for juveniles, the Court 
departed from its well-established response to Eighth Amendment claims 
involving non-capital sentences.   
To demonstrate how Miller and Graham cases break new ground in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, a little doctrinal background may be helpful.  The 
modern Court has adopted a two-track approach to reviewing the constitutionality 
of criminal sentences under the Eighth Amendment, reviewing death sentences far 
more rigorously than non-capital sentences.37  The mantra “Death is different”38 is 
embedded in Eighth Amendment doctrine.  Death sentences have long been subject 
to an independent assessment by the Court to be certain that the criminal law’s 
harshest sanction is not disproportionate punishment, given the circumstances of 
the offense and attributes of the offender.39  The Court has imposed procedural 
safeguards to ensure that the capital punishment is proportionate to the offense, 
including the requirement that a death sentence cannot be mandatory, and that the 
defendant must be allowed to introduce mitigating evidence to persuade the 
sentencer that he does not deserve the most severe sentence.40  Further, on 
occasion, the Court has held the death penalty to be disproportionate as applied to 
                                                                                                                            
37  See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009) (describing and 
critiquing the two-track approach under Eighth Amendment doctrine used to review capital and non-
capital sentences).  
38  Id. at 1146. 
39  Id.  
40  See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking 
down mandatory capital statutes because “the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the 
Eighth Amendment” requires individual review of the circumstances of the offender and offense prior 
to delivering a capital sentence); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) (rejecting a semi-mandatory capital sentencing scheme because sentencers must “not be 
precluded from considering [mitigating factors] . . .the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence 
less than death”) 
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a category of offenders, such as mentally retarded persons41 or juveniles.42  It has 
also prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for particular crimes that it 
deems to be less blameworthy than intentional killing.  Thus the death penalty 
cannot be imposed as punishment for rape43 (including rape of a child44) or felony 
murder where the defendant was not the actual killer and had no proven intent to 
kill.45 These crimes, the Court has concluded, are simply not sufficiently 
blameworthy to warrant the most severe punishment.  
But the modern Court has declined to undertake meaningful proportionality 
review of non-capital sentences.  Although, in theory, a sentence found to be 
“grossly excessive”46 could be overturned, the Court has emphasized that a 
successful challenge would be “exceedingly rare.”47  In recent years, it has not 
overturned an adult non-capital sentence on proportionality grounds.48 For 
example, a divided Court upheld a life sentence under California’s three strikes 
law of a man whose third offense involved the theft of a golf club.49  The Court has 
justified its deferential stance as an effort to avoid encroaching on legislative 
judgments through “subjective” evaluations of whether sentences are excessive.50  
                                                                                                                            
41  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
42  The Court first restricted the death penalty for juveniles aged fifteen and younger in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, emphasizing that youthful immaturity reduces culpability.  487 U.S. 815, 
835 (1988).  However, a year later the Court upheld the death penalty for juveniles aged sixteen and 
seventeen.  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).  In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
553 (2005), the Court revisited the juvenile death penalty two years after the ruling in Atkins, 536 
U.S. (2002), holding it to be unconstitutional under a proportionality analysis the death penalty for all 
juveniles. 
43  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty was grossly 
disproportionate to the crime of rape). 
44  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the death penalty as punishment for the rape of a child). 
45  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not 
permit the death penalty for a defendant who aids or abets a felony which results in a murder by 
others, when the defendant did not intend or attempt the murder himself).  
46  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality 
opinion).  
47  Id. at 1001 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). 
48  The most recent opinion rejecting a non-capital sentence on proportionality grounds was 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299–300 (1983) in which the Court overturned a mandatory life 
sentence for an offender’s seventh non-violent felony (writing a non-account check for $100).  
49  Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding life sentence); see also Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003) (denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus while upholding a 
life sentence for three petty thefts, the third of which was the theft of video tapes worth $70).  
50  See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 275 (1980).  The Court declined to apply the 
proportionality analysis from capital cases to a non-capital recidivism statute, highlighting the 
difference between the death penalty and term of years sentences.  The Court noted that objectivity is 
possible in analyzing whether the death penalty is excessive in a particular case because it could 
“draw a ‘bright line’ between the punishment of death and the various other permutations and 
commutations of punishments short of that ultimate sanction . . . this line was considerably clearer 
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On its view, death can readily be distinguished from other sentences, but there is 
no objective basis for determining that a particular term-of-years sentence is 
disproportionate as punishment for a particular crime.51  Accordingly, any 
conclusion that a sentence is excessive necessarily would amount to a subjective 
judgment by the Justices.  Moreover, the Court has assumed that a sentence can be 
justified for purposes of proportionality review under preventive as well as 
retributive theories of punishment.  Thus a sentence that might be excessive under 
conventional retributive theory could stand because it serves a deterrent purpose.52  
Not surprisingly, the Court has upheld a mandatory life sentencing scheme for 
adult offenders, observing that there is no “requirement of individualized 
sentencing in noncapital cases.”53  
Graham and Miller make clear that, for purposes of Eighth Amendment 
review of non-capital sentences (at least LWOP), juveniles are entitled to greater 
protection than adults.  The Court in these opinions set aside its typical deference 
to legislatures and applied constraints and protections for juveniles subjected to 
LWOP that previously were reserved to the death penalty context.  For example, 
Graham represents the only occasion on which the Court has categorically banned 
a sentence other than death on Eighth Amendment grounds.  Miller required a 
procedural protection for juveniles that adults only receive when facing the death 
penalty, holding that the sentence of LWOP cannot be mandatory and that a youth 
convicted of murder must be allowed to introduce mitigating evidence.54  
In these opinions, the Court based its judgment that LWOP was excessive for 
juveniles on the same proportionality analysis that was at the heart of Roper.  In 
fact, as I suggest below, this developmentally-grounded rationale for treating 
juvenile offenders more leniently than adults is perhaps even more central to the 
outcomes in the LWOP cases than in Roper.55  The Court also underscored the 
robustness of the proportionality analysis in these later opinions by emphasizing 
that the scientific evidence relevant to evaluating the criminal choices of juveniles 
                                                                                                                            
than would be any constitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of 
years.” 
51  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding no basis for concluding that 
a twenty-five year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment but a fifteen year sentence does not 
(citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 294)). 
52  Id. at 999; see infra note 73 (discussion of proportionality as based on retribution and the 
Court’s more expansive conception to include preventive goals).   
53  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006.  The Court emphasized that the prohibition of mandatory 
sentencing was limited to the death penalty context.  
54  Harmelin upheld a mandatory life sentence (precluding the opportunity to introduce 
mitigating evidence) for an adult offender.  The Court distinguishes Miller from Harmelin, noting 
that “Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its holding to the 
sentencing of juvenile offenders.  We have by now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule 
permissible for adults may not be so for children.”  Miller v. Alabama 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).  
55  I argue below that the objective comparative analysis of national legal trends played a 
smaller role in Miller than in the earlier cases.  See infra Part I.D. 
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versus adults was even stronger than in Roper—with new brain research 
confirming and reinforcing the behavioral research cited in the earlier opinion.56   
 
2. Juvenile LWOP and National Sentencing Norms  
 
Graham and Miller went beyond previous adult death penalty cases in their 
reliance on the Court’s independent proportionality analysis.  Indeed, as the 
dissenting Justices explained in great detail, Miller gave little weight to national 
sentencing norms in assessing mandatory LWOP for juveniles.  
In evaluating whether a death sentence constitutes excessive punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court typically (at least formally) has 
undertaken a two-part inquiry.  One part is the independent proportionality review 
described above; the second is a determination of whether a national consensus 
holds the sentence to be excessive.  In undertaking this inquiry, the Court has 
examined legislative trends and sentencing practices across jurisdictions to provide 
an external objective measure of contemporary norms.57  These inquiries aim to 
evaluate whether the sentence offends “evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.”58  In theory,  the review of national sentencing 
trends could be undertaken in a non-capital case as well, but the Court has made 
clear that this would be required only in the rare case in which the threshold 
requirement of “gross disproportionality” is first met.59   
Modern scholars have found the “evolving standards of decency” test to be 
generally unsatisfactory and have leveled sharp (and legitimate) criticisms against 
the test and its application by the Court.  First, skeptics have challenged the 
premise of the standard—that an advanced society moves inexorably toward more 
lenient sentences.  This assumption is belied by late twentieth century sentencing 
policy.60  Beyond this, the objective prong has been faulted on the ground that 
                                                                                                                            
56  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing Brief for American Med. Ass’n et 
al. as Amici Curiae at 16–24, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412); Brief for 
American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae at 22–27, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 
(2010) (No. 08-7412).  Miller amplified this message.  See infra note 88. 
57  See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality opinion).  This 
comparison sometimes extends to a comparison with sentencing practices in other countries.  See, 
e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (citing to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and law in other countries to show that very few countries allowed the death 
penalty to be imposed for crimes committed by juveniles); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 
(1977) (noting that only three out of sixty major nations retained the death penalty for rape that did 
not result in death). 
58  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (describing  evolving standards of decency 
standard); see supra note 27. 
59  See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality opinion). 
60  See infra Part II.A.2.  In his dissent in Graham v. Florida, Justice Thomas argued  “the 
Court pretermits in all but one direction the evolution of the standards it describes, thus calling a 
constitutional halt to what may well be a pendulum swing in social attitudes and stunting legislative 
consideration of new questions of penal policy as they emerge.”  130 S. Ct. 2011, 2045 (2010) 
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comparisons between the challenged sentence and national trends often seem 
strained and the inquiry sometimes appears to be outcome-driven.61  But the 
comparative analysis has been defended as an effort to discern whether the 
sentence is problematic on grounds more substantial than that it offends a majority 
of Justices on the Supreme Court.62  Under textbook Eighth Amendment doctrine, 
only if a sentence violates widely held societal norms about proportionate 
punishment should the Court override legislative choice and find it to be cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
The Court has increasingly deemphasized this comparative analysis in the 
juvenile cases, relying instead on its independent proportionality assessment as the 
basis for rejecting harsh sentences.  Roper evaluated legislative trends and 
sentencing practices regarding the juvenile death penalty and found a modest trend 
toward rejection of the sentence.63  But the national consensus inquiry became less 
important in Graham and played almost no role in Miller.  In Graham, for 
example, because many states authorized juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide 
offenses, the Court looked only to actual sentencing practices and concluded that 
the sentence was seldom imposed.64  Miller virtually abandoned any effort to 
discern a national consensus, partly because the contested sentence was imposed 
relatively frequently due to its mandatory nature.65  Instead the Court concluded 
                                                                                                                            
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Thomas also 
noted that states have consistently increased the severity of sentences imposed on juveniles.  Id. at 
2050; see also John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 919–20 (2011) (critiquing the standard and noting that 
“societal attitudes have become harsher and more punitive, not less so,” so that under the evolving 
standards of decency test, courts are unable to overrule new punishments that “. . . enjoy public 
support, for the fact that they enjoy public support shows that they comport with current standards of 
decency.”). 
61  Stinneford makes this point: “Because the punishments challenged before the Supreme 
Court usually involve divided societal opinion, application of the evolving standards of decency test 
rarely leads to a plausible decision to declare a punishment unconstitutional.”  Id. at 919. 
62  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174–76 (1976). 
63  Roper v. Simmons pointed to the states that had abolished the juvenile death penalty in the 
years since it had upheld the sentence for sixteen and seventeen year olds in Stanford v. Kentucky.  
Since Stanford, five states had abolished the death penalty for minors (four abolished it legislatively 
and one state rejected it by way of judicial decision).  543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005).  The Court 
compared legislation prohibiting the juvenile death penalty with the trend abolishing the death 
penalty for mentally retarded persons.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (abolishing the 
death penalty for retarded persons). 
64  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).  At the time, thirty-seven states 
authorized LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  However, only 109 juveniles were serving 
LWOP for nonhomicide crimes.   
65  In the twenty-nine states with mandatory LWOP statutes for homicide, challenged in 
Miller, all defendants convicted as adults of murder received the sentence; 2,500 prisoners serving 
LWOP were sentenced under these statutes for crimes committed as juveniles.  The Court suggested 
that the statutory scheme did not reflect an explicit legislative judgment that the sentence was 
appropriate for juveniles, since juveniles became eligible for mandatory LWOP indirectly on the 
basis of their transfer to adult court.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2012).   
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that LWOP was presumptively excessive for juveniles almost wholly on the basis 
of the scientifically-based analysis of attributes of adolescents that make juveniles 
less culpable and more likely to reform than adult offenders. 
Not surprisingly, the dissenting Justices and other critics railed at what was 
viewed as flimsy evidence that the imposition of LWOP on juvenile offenders 
offended any objective standard of decency.66  In Graham, the dissenters noted 
that a majority of states authorized LWOP for nonhomicide offenses committed by 
juveniles; they dismissed the small number of actual sentences as inadequate 
evidence of an emerging national consensus opposing LWOP.  But the dissenting 
Justices expressed particular outrage in Miller, given the large number of 
individuals serving LWOP for homicides committed as juveniles.67  Chief Justice 
Roberts also noted that mandatory LWOP statutes in fact were a relatively modern 
reform,68 challenging the assumption that standards of decency evolve in the 
direction of ever more lenient criminal punishment.69  In the view of critics, the 
juvenile opinions represent an illegitimate encroachment on legislative prerogative 
based on the subjective paternalistic judgment by the liberal Justices that juveniles 
should not be subject to harsh punishment.70  
 
C. Proportionality Analysis in a Developmental Framework 
 
Without question, the Court primarily relied on its independent 
proportionality assessment in its judgment that the challenged sentences 
represented cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles.  But the criticism directed 
at the opinions underestimates the robustness of this analysis and the extent to 
which it provides an objective basis for the conclusion that juveniles deserve less 
punishment than their adult counterparts.  This framework for analyzing juvenile 
                                                                                                                            
66  The dissenting justices also rejected the claim that a national consensus existed opposing 
the juvenile death penalty, given the small number of states that had repealed the sentence since 
Stanford.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.  
67  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2459.  
68  Id. at 2480 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
69  Id. at 2478.  John Stinneford criticizes the evolving standards of decency theory as being 
inappropriately focused on current public opinion and argues that courts should instead reject 
punishments that are “contrary to long usage” and thus inappropriately “unusual” under the Eighth 
Amendment.  John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a 
Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1746–47, 1752–54 (2008). 
70  Richard Posner critiques the Justices’ inability to act as “neutral experts” in Roper and 
accuses the Court of ignoring “both the evidence that contradicted their desired result and the 
limitations of the body of evidence that appeared to support that result.”  Richard Posner, Foreword: 
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 66 (2005).  Justice Alito in his Miller dissent was 
particularly offended by the majority describing young criminals, including his hypothetical 17-½-
year-old bomb thrower, as “children.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Thomas accused the majority of being overly subjective, arguing that “Eighth Amendment cases are 
no longer tied to any objective indicia of society’s standards.  Our Eighth Amendment case law is 
now entirely inward looking.”  Id. at 2490 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
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culpability is far from a subjective assessment of proportionality based only on the 
personal views of the Justices, an approach the Court has sought to avoid in its 
deferential stance in reviewing adult non-capital sentencing.  In the latter context, 
no clear baseline guides the judgment of whether a particular sanction is excessive: 
how long is too long?71  But youths under the age of eighteen represent a 
delineated category of criminal actors.  Developmental research clarifies that the 
factors that drive their criminal choices differentiate them from adult offenders.  
This is not to deny that there is some overlap between the categories; some 
juveniles may be indistinguishable from adults.  But the attributes of adolescence 
that distinguish juveniles from adults are not only verified through a solid and 
growing body of research, they can also be linked to factors that have long been 
sources of mitigation in criminal law doctrine.72  Moreover, the conclusion that 
juveniles, simply through maturation, are more likely to reform than adult 
criminals is also supported by substantial research, providing an independent basis 
for differential treatment under the Court’s capacious definition of the 
justifications for punishment relevant to proportionality review.73  
The Court focused on three dimensions of adolescence that distinguish 
juveniles from adult criminals and mitigate their blameworthiness.  First, the Court 
pointed to developmental influences that impair juveniles’ decision-making 
capacities, including their “inability to assess consequences”74 and the 
“recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking” that contribute to an 
“underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”75  These factors mitigate the culpability 
of youthful criminal choices under long-established doctrine.76  Second, mitigation 
also applies to crimes committed in response to extraordinary external coercion.77  
                                                                                                                            
71  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299 (1983). 
72  Laurence Steinberg and I have argued that the attributes of adolescence that make juveniles 
less culpable than their adult counterparts constitute conventional sources of mitigation in criminal 
law: diminished decisionmaking capacity; susceptibility to external coercion; and the absence of bad 
character.  The Court’s proportionality analysis  was based on these features of adolescence, but it did 
not explicitly link them to criminal law mitigation doctrine.  See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence 
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and 
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003). 
73  Criminal law theorists generally view proportionality as a retributive principle and favor 
limiting punishment to that which the offender deserves, excluding consideration of the law’s 
preventive purposes.  Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 677, 732 (2005).  The Court however has expanded the rationales for punishment, allowing 
sentences to satisfy proportionality review if they can be justified on the basis of either retribution or 
prevention.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality 
opinion).  
74  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
75  Id. at 2464.  
76  Courts have long recognized diminished decision making capacity based on age, mental 
disability, or mental illness as mitigating factors.  See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 826. 
77  The defense of duress is a good example.  Id. at 828.  
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This is relevant to juvenile offending because, as the Court explained, adolescents 
are vulnerable to negative pressures and influences, including peer influence, and 
have limited control over their environment or ability to extricate themselves from 
criminogenic settings.78  Finally, the Court pointed to the unformed nature of 
adolescent character, noting that, because much of a juvenile’s offending is the 
product of “transient immaturity,” it is less likely than an adult’s criminal conduct 
to be “evidence of irretrievable depravity.”79  In many states, and under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, defendants can introduce mitigating evidence at sentencing 
to demonstrate that their criminal activity was not the product of bad character.80  
In short, the Court’s conclusion that the harshest criminal sentences are actually or 
presumptively excessive for juveniles was firmly grounded in conventional 
criminal law doctrine—even though the Court did not explicitly link the key 
youthful attributes to specific mitigation sources.  Its proportionality analysis was 
not based on the majority justices’ subjective paternalistic inclinations toward 
youth.  
The Court’s conclusion that juveniles should not be subject to the harshest 
criminal sanctions was also based on its view that adolescents are more likely to 
reform than their adult counterparts.  That most youthful criminal activity is based 
on “unfortunate yet transient immaturity”81 is relevant to mitigation, as suggested 
above.  But this feature of juvenile offending also indicates that the law’s 
preventive purposes are often poorly served by lengthy criminal sentences.  Most 
youths mature out of their tendency to get involved in criminal activity in early 
adulthood and, as the Court noted, it is very difficult to distinguish a youth whose 
crime follows this typical pattern from the uncommon young offender whose crime 
represents “irreparable corruption.”82  Thus sentencing a youth to LWOP cannot be 
justified on public protection grounds.  Little social benefit is likely to derive from 
the sentence in most cases.  
Both the retributive and preventive dimensions of the Court’s proportionality 
analysis are supported by solid scientific research—not the typical judicial 
                                                                                                                            
78  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 818 (juveniles as legal 
minors are not free to leave their families, neighborhoods, etc.).    
79  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).  
80  With mitigating character evidence, defendants effectively seek to rebut the inference that 
their criminal act was a product of bad character.  Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 827.  Much 
adolescent criminal activity is the product of developmental influences and not of bad character.  
Personal identity is in flux in adolescence and doesn’t settle until early adulthood.  Id. at 834. 
81  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
82  Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, quoted in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).  The 
Court in Roper points to the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
provides that the diagnosis of psychopathy cannot be made until age eighteen and concludes that “[i]f 
trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic 
expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we 
conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation—that a 
juvenile offender merits the death penalty.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.  
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invocation of a few random studies to support a legal proposition.  A large body of 
behavioral research confirms that adolescents are more impulsive, risk-seeking, 
subject to peer influence, and inclined to focus on the immediate consequences of 
their choices than are adults.83  Moreover, as the Court noted, the evidence that 
adolescents are immature in ways that are relevant to their offending has become 
even more robust since Roper.84  A growing body of developmental neuroscience 
research indicates that the areas of the brain that govern impulse control, planning, 
and foresight of consequences mature slowly over the course of adolescence and 
into early adulthood, while the arousal of the limbic system around puberty 
increases sensation seeking in early adolescence.  This research provides a 
powerful hypothesis linking brain development to reckless antisocial behavior in 
teenagers.85 Moreover, many studies find a similar pattern of adolescent offending, 
with the aggregate level of criminal involvement beginning at about age thirteen 
and increasing until age seventeen, followed by a sharp decline.86  This age-crime 
trajectory confirms the transitory nature of most adolescent offending and supports 
the Court’s judgment that juveniles are more likely to reform than their adult 
counterparts.  
In sum, the Court’s proportionality analysis in the juvenile cases provides a 
sound basis for its rejection of harsh sentences as excessive.  The analysis is based 
not on conventional wisdom or “what any parent knows,”87 but on developmental 
science.  A comprehensive body of research supports the Court’s conclusion that 
juveniles as a group differ from adults in ways that mitigate culpability because 
their offenses are driven by transitory developmental influences.  The research, 
however, does not indicate that every youth deserves mitigation.  Accordingly, 
individualized sentencing can be accommodated within the proportionality 
framework (though at a risk of error, which—at least at this point—the Court is 
ready to accept for youths convicted of murder).  But the research justifies the 
                                                                                                                            
83  SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 130–39. 
84  Miller pointed to the explosion in developmental neuroscience research post-Roper which 
supported the analysis of both Roper and Graham about the diminished culpability of youth.  Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5 (citing Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 
3). 
85  One scientist described the gap between increases in sensation seeking in early adolescence 
based on development in the brain’s limbic system and the later development of executive control 
functions as “starting the engines with an unskilled driver.”  Ronald Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain 
Development and Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 1, 69 (2001); see 
also Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public 
Policy?,  64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739 (2009) [hereinafter Adolescent Brain Development] (describing 
dimensions of brain development relevant to criminal offending); see also Richard Bonnie & 
Elizabeth Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, in CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCIENCE (2013).  
86  Alex Piquero, David Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, The Criminal Career Paradigm: 
Background and Recent Developments, 20 CRIME & JUST. 359 (Michael Tonry ed. 2003) (describing 
the age-crime trajectory). 
87  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–66 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
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Court’s approach of designating juveniles as a special category of offenders under 
the Eighth Amendment, who presumptively should receive more lenient 
punishment than adult criminals.   
 
D. Graham and Miller and Eighth Amendment Doctrine: Two Competing Themes  
 
Graham and Miller broke new ground in Eighth Amendment doctrine.  At this 
point, however, it is difficult to predict the scope of their influence—or whether 
the Court will impose further constitutional limits on legislative authority to punish 
juveniles as adults.  Two related but distinct themes emerge in Graham and Miller:  
the first theme is that for juveniles, LWOP is like the death penalty.  The second is 
that children are different.  It is quite plausible that the Court, focusing on the first 
theme, will limit the scope of special Eighth Amendment protection for young 
offenders to restricting the sentence of LWOP.  But if it takes the “children are 
different” principle seriously, the opinions may have a broader influence on 
constitutional doctrine.  
The Court makes explicit the correspondence between LWOP and the death 
penalty in both Graham and Miller.88  LWOP represents a “forfeiture that is 
irrevocable.”89  Post-Roper, it is the most severe sentence a juvenile can receive.  
Further, as Graham noted, juveniles serving LWOP effectively are subject to more 
severe sentences than their adult counterparts because they are likely to spend 
more time in prison.  On the basis of the death-LWOP comparison, the Graham 
Court categorically banned LWOP as disproportionate for nonhomicide offenses—
just as it had categorically excluded the death penalty for certain classes of 
offenses and offenders.90  In Miller, the Court prohibited the mandatory imposition 
of LWOP on a juvenile offender and required that the decision be individualized so 
that the defendant could introduce mitigating evidence—the same protections 
afforded adult offenders facing a death sentence.91  Under a narrow interpretation 
of Graham and Miller, the Court has simply extended the constitutional 
protections that apply to the death penalty to the non-capital sentence of LWOP for 
juveniles, because the two sentences are analogous for these young offenders.  If 
this is the meaning of Graham and Miller, the Court’s proportionality analysis may 
be extended to other LWOP challenges, but not to other sentences or to other 
special protections.  
                                                                                                                            
88  The Court emphasizes LWOP “share[s] some characteristics with death sentences that are 
shared by no other sentences” and that “this lengthiest possible incarceration is an especially harsh 
punishment for a juvenile because he will almost inevitably serve more years and a greater 
percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Graham 
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010)) (internal quotations omitted).  
89  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.  
90  Graham represented the first time the Supreme Court categorically excluded a class of 
offenders from a non-capital offense.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466–67.  
91  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).  
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But a second theme also clearly emerged in Miller: that juveniles are a special 
category of offenders and that the attributes that make them different from adults 
are relevant to criminal punishment.  The Court distinguished the mandatory 
sentence in Miller from a similar sentencing scheme for adults upheld in Harmelin 
v. Michigan,92 reminding skeptics that it had held “on multiple occasions that a 
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.”93  In 
announcing “if . . . death is different, children are different too”94 under Eighth 
Amendment doctrine, Miller offered a powerful principle with potentially far-
reaching impact.  The Court’s insistence that its proportionality analysis was not 
“crime-specific” is another strong statement that juvenile offending generally is 
less culpable than that of adults—and not simply when they engage in criminal 
conduct that carries a possible LWOP sentence.  As Chief Justice Roberts 
observed, “[t]he principle behind today’s decision seems to be only that because 
juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced differently.  There is no 
clear reason that principle would not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or 
any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would receive.”95  
This is a fair reading of Miller, although it seems unlikely that the Court will 
apply this principle as a constitutional constraint on sentencing juveniles as 
broadly as Chief Justice Roberts fears.  But the principle that “children [or 
adolescents] are different” potentially has Eighth Amendment and other 
constitutional implications that extend beyond LWOP.96  It may be invoked to 
challenge conditions of confinement,97 the lack of educational and other 
developmentally important services in prison,98 and the failure to assure that 
juveniles facing adult prosecution are competent to stand trial.99  But even beyond 
its possible implications for expanding constitutional protections for juveniles, 
                                                                                                                            
92  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1006. (1991). The Court in Harmelin emphasized that 
death was unlike “all other penalties.”  Id. at 995. 
93  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
96  Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme Court Adopts a 
Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda Custody 
Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 501 (2012). 
97  For example, the not-uncommon practice of putting juveniles in solitary confinement in 
adult prisons (which is particularly harmful on developmental grounds for juveniles) could be 
challenged on Eighth Amendment grounds.  Teens in Solitary Confinement, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/10/us-teens-solitary-confinement.   
98  See JAMES AUSTIN, KELLY JOHNSON & MARIA GREGORIOU, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT xi (2000) (finding “little evidence 
of efforts to customize programs for youthful offenders.”). 
99  See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and 
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005) (describing how developmental immaturity 
affects youths’ competence to stand trial).  
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Miller’s symbolic importance is hard to exaggerate.  To be sure, the opinions affect 
a relatively small number of offenders convicted of the most serious crimes.  But 
our highest legal institution has emphatically rejected the approach to juvenile 
crime that dominated in the 1990s, when the relevance to criminal punishment of 
differences between juvenile and adult offenders was either ignored or denied.  As 
I will show below, the principle announced by the Court, and the lessons amplified 
in Miller are likely to reverberate through the justice system and to profoundly 
influence other lawmakers.  
 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FOR JUVENILE CRIME POLICY 
 
The Supreme Court opinions rejecting harsh sentences for juveniles will not 
be universally embraced, of course, but they are not likely to be highly 
controversial in the contemporary political climate surrounding youth crime 
regulation.  Indeed, the constitutional values that animated the opinions and the 
perspective the Court adopted can be discerned in contemporary political discourse 
on youth crime, and seem to be taking hold among lawmakers.  The Court’s Eighth 
Amendment opinions have imbued an emerging perspective on juvenile crime with 
constitutional significance, elevating its likely impact in the policy arena.  But this 
perspective stands in sharp contrast to the view of teenage crime regulation that 
prevailed in the 1990s.  Thus, the Supreme Court opinions are important in part 
because they so clearly repudiate the attitudes and policies of this relatively recent 
period. 
In this Part, I will show that together with the general expressive importance 
of the Court’s pronouncements as an influence on justice policy, four important 
and discrete lessons can be derived from the opinions: the first lesson is embodied 
in the principle that Chief Justice Roberts laments100—that adolescents are less 
culpable than adult offenders and presumptively should not be subject to the same 
punishment for their crimes.  This principle challenges laws enacted in the 1990s 
that facilitated adult prosecution and punishment of juveniles.  The second lesson, 
derived from Miller, provides guidance for regulating decisions about which 
youths should be eligible for adult prosecution and the process for making that 
determination.  Traditional laws mandating an individualized transfer hearing in 
which the youth has a meaningful opportunity to present evidence of his 
immaturity are more compatible with constitutional values than recently enacted 
statutes that automatically transfer youths charged with serious crimes or give 
prosecutors broad discretion to try juveniles as adults.101  Third, the Court’s 
insistence that juveniles have greater potential for reform than do adult offenders 
                                                                                                                            
100 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
101 In New York, a thirteen-year-old charged with murder is defined as an adult and excluded from 
juvenile court jurisdiction.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (McKinney 1994); see also, NAT’L. CENTER FOR JUV. JUST., 
http://www.ncjj.org/Research_Resources/State_Profiles.aspx (listing states with automatic transfer and direct file 
statutes).  
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offers constitutional support for a regime of dispositions that facilitate the 
development of juvenile offenders into non-criminal adults.  And fourth, the 
opinions underscore that juvenile crime policy is appropriately grounded in 
developmental science, including neurobiological research on brain 
development—indeed, developmental knowledge reinforces the other three 
lessons.  
The lessons grounded in the recent Supreme Court opinions may resonate 
with many lawmakers in the contemporary political climate, but they represent a 
repudiation of the juvenile justice regime that took hold in the late twentieth 
century.  In the 1990s, public fear and anger directed toward young 
“superpredators” fueled moral panics in response to juvenile crime.102  Politicians 
intent on protecting the public from the threat pushed urgently for tough laws, 
rejecting the traditional rehabilitative model of juvenile justice as well as the idea 
that adolescents were different from adults in any way relevant to the justice 
system’s response to their crimes.  Law reforms in almost every state facilitated 
adult prosecution and punishment of juveniles, often through automatic transfer 
statutes that categorically classified youths charged with particular serious crimes 
as adults. 103 The mantra of that period might well have been, “children are not 
different”—at least when it comes to criminal prosecution and punishment.104   
The moral panics of the 1990s have subsided, and in recent years a more 
deliberative approach to juvenile crime has emerged.  The change in attitude in 
part represents a pragmatic recognition that imprisonment of juveniles is costly and 
often less effective at reducing crime than developmentally-based correctional 
programs.105  Concern about the fairness of punishing juveniles as adults has also 
created uneasiness with incarceration-based policies, especially because minority 
youths are far more likely to receive harsh sentences.  In the past decade, 
developmental neuroscience research has captured public attention, persuading 
many that immature adolescent brains contribute to teenage criminal activity.106 
These factors have converged to create a political environment that is receptive to 
the lessons offered by the Supreme Court in the juvenile opinions.  
                                                                                                                            
102 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 95–96 for a discussion of the 1990s response to 
juvenile crime.  The term ‘superpredator’ was coined by John DiIulio, who predicted a wave of 
violent crime committed by youths growing up in moral poverty.  John J. DiIulio, Jr.,  The Coming of 
the Superpredators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995. 
103 See supra note 101.  Indeed, it was this expansion of transfer to adult court that resulted in 
many youths facing LWOP sentences under statutes such as those rejected in Graham and Miller.  
For a discussion of the reforms, see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 96–99. 
104 In fact, the slogan “adult time for adult crime” was often invoked by punitive reformers.  
An early advocate of tough reforms, Alfred Regnery, head of the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention under President Reagan, noted, “[T]here is no reason for punishing an 
offender less simply because he is sixteen.”  Getting Away with Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice 
System Needs an Overhaul, 34 POL’Y REV. 65, 68 (1987).   
105 See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 184–91. 
106 Steinberg, supra note 85; Bonnie & Scott, supra note 85; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5 
at 184–91.  
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This Part first sets the stage with a brief history of juvenile crime regulation 
over the past generation and then examines the four lessons offered by the Court.  
In combination, these lessons provide a template for fair and effective juvenile 
crime policy.  The three Supreme Court opinions provide a solid foundation for a 
developmental model of juvenile crime regulation based on the premise that 
adolescents are different from adults in ways that mitigate culpability and that 
young offenders have a greater potential to reform. 
 
A. Juvenile Crime Regulation in Flux 
 
  What follows is a brief history of a tumultuous period in juvenile crime 
policy.  It begins with a description of the moral panics and the resulting punitive 
law reforms that transformed juvenile crime policy in the 1990s.  It then describes 
factors that have led many policymakers to rethink this approach and have 
contributed to a climate more receptive to a regulatory approach that recognizes 
the differences between juveniles and adults.  In this setting, the impact of the 
lessons offered by the Supreme Court is likely to be amplified.  
 
1. Law Reform as Moral Panic 
 
The legal and policy changes of the 1990s began in response to a legitimate 
concern: an increase in violent youth crime in the late 1980s.107  Public alarm 
about this threat was reinforced by a widespread perception that the traditional 
juvenile justice system with its emphasis on rehabilitation was ineffective at 
dealing with violent youths and that tougher laws were needed.108  As the media 
intensified its focus on juvenile crime and politicians responded with promises to 
protect the public, perceptions about the seriousness of the threat escalated and 
young criminals were demonized as predators; they came to be seen as the enemies 
of society.109  Although high profile crimes by juveniles such as school shootings 
and the killing of innocent bystanders by juvenile gangs were rare occurrences, 
public alarm was fueled by media attention and exploited by politicians.  
Consequently, these incidents came to be seen as evidence of an epidemic of youth 
                                                                                                                            
107 See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 96–99; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998). 
108 In one study, seventy percent of those questioned believed that leniency in the juvenile 
justice system contributed to violent youth crime.  SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
(Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1990).  See also Jane B. Sprott, Understanding 
Public Opposition to a Separate Juvenile System, 44 CRIME & DELINQ. 399 (1998) (survey finding 
support for view that juvenile system’s laxness  encouraged youth crime). 
109 See, e.g., Editorial, Heading Off the Superpredators, TAMPA TRIB., May 21, 1996, at 8 
(“They are called suprepredators.  They are not here yet but they are predicted to be a plague upon 
the United States in the next decade.”). 
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violence.110  In general, perceptions of the threat posed by young offenders became 
greatly exaggerated, with surveys indicating that the public erroneously thought 
that juveniles were responsible for most violent crime.111  The perception that 
juvenile crime was on the rise and that an even greater threat loomed in the future 
only increased the sense of urgency; this perception persisted long after crime rates 
began a steady decline in 1994.112  Protecting the public from teenage predators 
became an urgent priority for politicians, prosecutors and judges. 
This was the social and political setting for sweeping law reforms that 
fundamentally altered youth crime regulation in almost every state.  During this 
period, legislatures greatly expanded criminal court jurisdiction over young 
offenders in several ways.  Judicial transfer laws were amended to allow adult 
prosecution of younger juveniles and the range of transfer-eligible crimes was 
greatly expanded to include less serious felonies, including property and drug 
offenses.113  Two other reforms enacted by many state legislatures have had an 
even greater impact.  First, automatic transfer statutes that set the jurisdictional age 
below the age of eighteen have excluded teenagers from juvenile court jurisdiction, 
either categorically (in states in which the general jurisdictional age is sixteen or 
seventeen) or when charged with particular felonies.114  Estimates indicate that 
250,000 youths under the age of eighteen are prosecuted and punished as adults 
under these statutes, half for non-violent crimes.115  Second, in response to 
                                                                                                                            
110 See, e.g., Rod Nordland, Deadly Lessons, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992; Eloise Salholz, How 
to Keep Kids Safe, NEWSEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at 30.   
111 A 1996 survey of 1,000 likely California voters found that sixty percent of respondents 
believed that juveniles were responsible for most violent crime.  In reality, only fourteen percent of 
arrests for violent crimes involved juveniles.  See Lori Dorfman & Vincent Schiraldi, Off Balance: 
Youth, Race & Crime in the News, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH at  3–4, 40 n.10 (2001), available at 
www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf (describing results of study). 
112 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 99 (discussing the popular prediction of a coming wave of 
“superpredators”). 
113 In California today, youths age fourteen and older can be transferred for thirty offenses, 
including minor drug selling.  CAL. WELF. AND INSTIT. CODE § 707 (West 2011).  Under traditional 
law, transfer was rare and in most states, was reserved for teens age sixteen and older charged with 
serious violent crimes (e.g. murder, rape, kidnapping, aggravated assault).  SCOTT & STEINBERG, 
supra note 5, at 98.  
114 For example, in Illinois, a fifteen year old charged with drug distribution near a school was 
treated as an adult.  (This statute was repealed in 2005.)  In two states (New York and North 
Carolina), the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction is age fifteen and in ten states, the maximum age is 
sixteen.  NAT’L. CENTER FOR JUV. JUST., JUVENILE TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT PROVISIONS BY STATE, 
available at http://www.ncjj.org/Research_Resources/State_Profiles.aspx.  Richard Redding lists thirty-one 
states with automatic transfer statutes for some offenses in 2003.  Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer 
Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, OJJDP JUV. JUST. BULL. Jun. 2010, available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf. 
115 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 4; CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, ET AL., OFF. JUV. JUST. & 
DEL. PREVENTION, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2000, (2004) (citing statistics); In New York alone, 
almost 45,873 sixteen and seventeen year old youths were charged as adults in 2010.  Mosi Secret, New 
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dissatisfaction with juvenile court judges, who were perceived to be too lenient, 
many states passed “direct-file” statutes that give prosecutors the authority to 
decide whether a youth charged with a serious crime should be dealt with as an 
adult or as a juvenile.116  Under both automatic transfer and direct file laws, the 
jurisdictional question is no longer made in an individualized transfer hearing in 
which the youth’s immaturity is considered.  The reforms of the 1990s also had an 
impact on the operation of the juvenile system: dispositions became much harsher 
as incarceration became the norm for many youths who once would have received 
community sanctions.117  In general, these legal reforms blurred the jurisdictional 
and functional boundaries between the juvenile and adult justice systems and they 
resulted in harsher criminal sanctions for many juveniles.118 
The hostility and fear that characterized attitudes toward young offenders in 
the 1990s resulted in policies and decisions driven primarily by immediate public 
safety concerns and the goal of punishing young criminals.  In this pressured 
environment, decisionmakers seldom considered the long term consequences of 
their choices, including the impact of imprisonment on recidivism and on the 
future trajectories of young offenders’ lives.  Moreover, values that would be 
deemed important to the legitimacy of the justice system in ordinary times got little 
attention—such as the disproportionate imposition of harsh sentences on minority 
youths or the fairness of subjecting teenagers to adult sentences.119  The core 
assumption of the traditional model of juvenile justice—that young offenders were 
different from their adult counterparts and should receive different treatment—was 
largely dismissed.120 
 
                                                                                                                            
York Judge Seeks New System for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/nyregion/new-yorks-chief-judge-seeks-new-system-for-juvenile-
defendants.html. 
116 NATIONAL OVERVIEWS, NAT’L. CENTER FOR JUV. JUST., available at http://www.ncjj.org; 
PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. &DELINQ. PRESERVATION, STATE RESPONSES TO 
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME (1996), available at ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf 
[hereinafter State Responses]. 
117 See STEVE AOS, WASH. STATE INSTIT. FOR PUB. POL’Y, The Juvenile Justice System in 
Washington State: Recommendations to Improve Cost-Effectiveness 3 (Oct. 2002), available at 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=02-10-1201 (describing increased use of incarceration in 
Washington state). 
118 For a general overview of the trend toward more punitive policies toward juveniles charged 
with violent crimes in the early 1990s, see TORBET ET AL., supra note 116, at 4. 
119 Substantial racial disparities begin with police contact.  Minority youths are far more likely 
than white youths to be apprehended.  See, e.g., DAVID HUIZINGA, TERENCE THORNBERRY, KELLY 
KNIGHT & PETER LOVEGROVE, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: A STUDY OF DIFFERENTIAL MINORITY ARREST/REFERRAL TO COURT IN THREE CITIES, (2007), 
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/ (finding “clear evidence” of disproportionate minority 
contact with police). 
120 See Regnery, supra note 104 (expressing view that age of young offenders is irrelevant to 
criminal punishment).  
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2. A Twenty-First Century Perspective on Juvenile Crime    
 
During the past decade, the tone of discourse about juvenile crime has 
changed and a different regulatory approach has begun to take hold.  In part, this is 
because the moral panics of the 1990s subsided as the public gradually (and 
belatedly) recognized that juvenile crime was less of a threat than it had seemed to 
be.121  Lawmakers also began to recognize that incarceration-based policies were 
costly; their budgetary impact became more burdensome with the severe recession 
in 2008.  Just as importantly, policymakers have come to realize that incarcerating 
young offenders likely contributes to a high rate of reoffending, while some 
developmentally-based community programs have been shown to be very effective 
at reducing recidivism.122  Since reducing crime through cost effective sanctions is 
a key goal of any criminal justice policy, over time these long-term practical 
considerations have dampened lawmakers’ enthusiasm for harsh juvenile 
sentences. 
At the heart of this change in attitude is a growing tendency among 
lawmakers and the public to accept (once again) that young offenders are different 
from adults.  In part, this may be simply a resurfacing of traditional paternalistic 
attitudes toward youth that were submerged in the 1990s.  But contemporary 
attitudes increasingly have been influenced by a body of developmental research 
that offers a far more sophisticated account of differences between adolescents and 
adults than was available in an earlier era.  In particular, public and media interest 
has focused on neuroscience studies suggesting that immaturity in the brain’s 
executive functions during adolescence may affect teenagers’ decisions about 
involvement in criminal activity.123  This research seems to have been influential in 
                                                                                                                            
121 Violent juvenile crime rates began a steady decade-long decline in 1994.  Rates declined for other 
crimes shortly thereafter.  See OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, Juvenile Arrest Rate Trends (Dec. 17, 
2012), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 (“The juvenile 
arrest rate for all offenses reached its highest level in the last two decades in 1996, and then declined 
thirty-six percent by 2009.”); Charles Puzzanchera, OJJDP JUV. JUST. BULLETIN, Juvenile Arrests 
2008, (Dec. 2009), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf (describing declining rates 
for specific offenses). 
122 In 2009, a New York Task Force appointed by Governor Patterson issued a scathing 
critique of that state’s juvenile justice system, pointing to the high recidivism rate among youths sent 
to institutional facilities.  The report urged the use of evidence based community programs.  TASK 
FORCE ON TRANSFORMING JUV. JUST., CHARTING A NEW COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE (2009) [hereinafter CHARTING A NEW COURSE].  See also 
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 217–20, for a discussion of successful programs.   
123 See e.g., Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teenage Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 58; Claudia 
Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick?, TIME, Sept. 26, 2008, at 56; Malcolm Ritter, Experts Link Teen Brains’ 
Immaturity, Juvenile Crime, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 2007, available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2007-12-02-teenbrains_N.htm. 
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changing attitudes about young offenders; it has been invoked in support of a 
broad range of policies dealing more leniently with juvenile offenders.124 
The recognition that much juvenile offending differs from adult criminal 
activity in that it is driven by developmental immaturity challenges the punitive 
approach to juvenile crime in two ways.  First, it supports the pragmatic critique of 
incarceration-based policies described above.  Policymakers favoring a shift in 
resources from institutions to community-based programs have pointed to the 
particular harms to adolescents of imprisonment and to the greater effectiveness of 
developmentally appropriate correctional dispositions.125  But accepting that 
teenagers are immature in ways that influence their criminal choices also 
challenges the fairness of prosecuting and punishing them as adults.  While 
politicians in the 1990s dismissed the notion that adult punishment was 
disproportionate for juveniles, this concern has generated increased uneasiness in 
recent years.  On occasion, the public has responded with sympathy to young 
offenders serving long sentences, leading to the moderation of harsh laws.  In 
Colorado, for example, a series of news stories about youths serving LWOP 
sentences stirred opposition to this sentence; in response, the legislature abolished 
the sentence for juveniles altogether (even before the Supreme Court).126  Fairness 
concerns have also become acute when the disproportionate impact of tough 
policies on minority youths is recognized.  Thus, Illinois repealed a statute 
automatically transferring fifteen-year-olds charged with selling drugs near schools 
in the face of evidence that the statute was applied overwhelmingly against African 
American youths.127  In short, two themes characterize the recent dissatisfaction 
with the justice policies of the late twentieth century—harsh criminal sentences 
imposed on juveniles represent disproportionate punishment, and they also are 
ineffective in furthering the long term goal of crime reduction.  Both responses are 
based on the recognition that adolescents are different from adults. 
                                                                                                                            
124 For an overview, see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 266–68; Bonnie & Scott, supra 
note 85.  
125 The 2009 New York Governor’s Task Force report emphasized the high cost of 
institutionalizing youths  ($210,000 per year, per youth), the majority of whom were misdemeanants, 
and their very high recidivism rates.  The system’s punitive approach, it stated, “damaged the future 
prospects of these young people, wasted millions of taxpayer dollars, and violated the fundamental principles 
of positive youth development.”  CHARTING A NEW COURSE, supra note 122, at 8.  New York City officials 
responded by announcing a drastic reduction in the number of city youths sent to state institutions.  Julie 
Bosman, City Signals Intent to Put Fewer Teenagers in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/nyregion/21juvenile.html?ref=nyregion&pagewanted=print (describing 
a cost of $17,000 per youth for community program).   
126 See Gwen Florio, Sue Lindsey & Sarah Langbein, Life for Death: Should Teen Murderers 
get a Second Chance at Freedom?, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 17, 2005, at 1A.  Governor Bill Owen 
pointed to brain research in explaining his support.  Miles Moffeit & Kevin Simpson, Research 
Points to Changing Teen Brain, DENVER POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at A1; Miles Moffeit, Juvenile Justice 
Legislation a Milestone in Sentencing, DENVER POST, May 28, 2006.  
127 MARY SCHMID, NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, 2005 STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE 
LEGISLATION (Nov. 2005), available at http://njdc.info/publications.php.  
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It would be an exaggeration to suggest that attitudes toward juvenile crime 
have been transformed in recent years or that lawmakers have retreated 
dramatically from the punitive model of regulation that dominated in the 1990s.  
The shifts in attitude and policy have been modest and gradual; many laws enacted 
in the 1990s remain on the books.  But teenage lawbreakers are no longer labeled 
as superpredators in the political arena.  Over the past decade, hostility toward 
young criminals has dissipated substantially, producing a climate in which 
lawmakers have been more inclined to deliberate and to consider long term goals 
and values as well as immediate concerns.  In this environment, policymakers have 
adopted a more pragmatic and less punitive approach to juvenile crime regulation.   
 
B. Four Lessons for Youth Crime Policy 
 
These political and policy changes provide the backdrop for the Supreme 
Court’s consideration of whether the imposition of harsh criminal sentences on 
juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  The opinions discussed in this essay, with their emphasis on how 
distinctive features of adolescence are important to the legal response to youthful 
offending, embody a twenty-first century understanding of juvenile crime.  In this 
way, the Court has effectively reinforced and strengthened the emerging legal 
trend and provided four key lessons for its future direction.  
 
1. Lesson One: Fair Punishment and Proportionality 
 
The first and broadest lesson offered by the Court is embodied in the 
mitigation principle lamented by Chief Justice Roberts in his Miller dissent—that 
juvenile offenders, due to their developmental immaturity, are less culpable than 
their adult counterparts and (usually) should be sentenced more leniently for their 
criminal offenses.  The Court recognized that proportionality is essential to a 
constitutionally legitimate justice system and rejected sentences that are excessive 
on the basis of juveniles’ reduced culpability.  Moreover, the Court emphasized 
that this reduced culpability applies generally to juveniles’ criminal offenses, 
implying that mitigation should broadly inform youth crime regulation.  I have 
argued that the mitigation principle embraced by the Court is solidly grounded in 
the attributes of adolescence that distinguish youthful offending from that of adults 
and that correspond to various sources of mitigation in criminal law.  In short, the 
first lesson is that a legitimate and fair justice system recognizes the reduced 
blameworthiness of this group of offenders and punishes them less severely than 
adults.  
The Court, in announcing that “children are different” and creating a special 
Eighth Amendment status for juveniles, implicitly rebuked law reformers of the 
1980s and 1990s who insisted that there was no reason that young offenders should 
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receive more lenient punishment than adults.128  Indeed, in the hostile climate that 
surrounded youth crime during that period, teenage predators were depicted as 
more culpable and certainly more dangerous than adult criminals.129  As 
legislatures executed sweeping legal changes that greatly expanded criminal court 
jurisdiction over juveniles, little (if any) attention was directed at whether adult 
sentences were excessive for juveniles.  Conventional criminal law theory holds 
that proportionate punishment should be based on the seriousness of the harm but 
also on the blameworthiness of the criminal actor.130  But the punitive reformers 
assumed that juveniles—like typical adult offenders—were sufficiently 
blameworthy to be punished solely on the basis of the harms of their offenses.  By 
focusing on traits of young offenders that reduce their culpability, the Supreme 
Court rejected this assumption and the incomplete proportionality analysis on 
which it implicitly rested.  
Although the first lesson—that juveniles presumptively should be punished 
more leniently than their adult counterparts—is unlikely to be fully entrenched in 
constitutional doctrine, it embodies constitutional values that can shape justice 
policy and practice in several ways.  First, the mitigation principle supplies a 
rationale for retaining most juveniles in a separate justice system that 
systematically deals with offenders within its jurisdiction more leniently than does 
the criminal justice system.  Traditionally, the juvenile and criminal systems were 
distinguished in part on the basis of the severity of sanctions in the two regimes—
and this distinction continues to justify retaining a clear boundary between them.131  
The Court’s proportionality analysis also supports a regime in which adult 
prosecution and punishment are “uncommon.”  Further, because (as the Court 
noted) the conclusion that a youth can fairly be subject to adult criminal 
punishment is subject to a high risk of error,132 juveniles convicted in adult court 
presumptively should receive reduced sentences as compared to their adult 
counterparts.  In theory, as Barry Feld has argued, proportionality values could be 
served in a unitary system in which youths were adjudicated in criminal court, but 
received a “youth discount” in sentencing in recognition of their reduced 
                                                                                                                            
128 See Regnery, supra note 104.  
129 See DiIulio, supra note 102 (describing “superpredators”). 
130 For a discussion of the importance of the proportionality principle to criminal punishment, 
see RICHARD BONNIE, ANNE COUGHLIN, JOHN JEFFRIES & PETER LOW, CRIMINAL LAW 901–58 (2004).  
131 Of course, the leniency of the traditional juvenile court generated much criticism in the late 
twentieth century, see MAQUIRE & FLANAGAN, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra 
note 108, but this may have been because leniency was excessive or other justice system goals such 
as public protection and crime reduction received inadequate attention.   
132 The Court noted this high risk of error in distinguishing the youth whose crime is a product 
of immaturity from one who is “incorrigible” in categorically prohibiting the imposition of the death 
penalty and LWOP for nonhomicide offenses on juveniles.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005).  See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 826 
(discussing this challenge). 
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culpability.133  But such a regime cannot be justified because it fails to serve other 
justice system values and goals, such as crime prevention.134  Instead, only a small 
category of juveniles should be eligible for adult prosecution and, as indicated 
below, the judgment should be made on an individualized basis.   
 
2. Lesson Two: Transfer and Eligibility for Adult Prosecution 
 
The Court’s second lesson for policymakers builds on the first: given that 
juveniles are presumptively less culpable than their adult counterparts, the decision 
about whether a particular youth will be tried as an adult should be made in a way 
that is compatible with constitutional values.  Nothing in the Court’s approach to 
the sentencing of juveniles supports excluding all juveniles from the criminal 
justice system.  Indeed, the offenders in Roper, Graham, and Miller whose 
sentences were struck by the Court were imprisoned as adults, and most continued 
to serve prison terms after the decisions.  But the lesson of these opinions for 
policymakers is that only youths charged with the most harmful felonies should be 
eligible for criminal court jurisdiction and that the decision should be made in an 
individualized hearing in which the court can consider the youth’s immaturity and 
other mitigating factors. 
This lesson is based on the distinction the Court draws between homicide and 
nonhomicide offenses in Graham and Miller and its insistence on individualized 
consideration of mitigation as a condition of imposing LWOP even for homicide.  
In prohibiting LWOP for nonhomicide offenses committed by juveniles, Graham 
emphasized both the generally reduced culpability of juveniles and the lesser harm 
of nonhomicide offenses.  On these grounds, the Court excluded these offenses 
categorically from eligibility for the harsh sentence of LWOP.  In contrast, Miller 
allowed the sentence of LWOP for murder because of the severe harm caused by 
the crime, but only on the basis of an individualized hearing to determine that the 
juvenile is sufficiently “corrupt” to warrant the sentence.  Thus the Court 
recognized not only that certain crimes (murder) deserve more punishment than 
others because of the harm inflicted, but also that even those youths who have 
caused great harm usually will not deserve the same punishment as adults and 
should not be categorically subject to the same sanctions. 
This framework can be applied more generally to regulate the transfer of 
juveniles to adult court.  It argues for excluding juveniles from criminal court 
jurisdiction for all but the most harmful felonies: those that involve serious 
                                                                                                                            
133 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 315–
28 (1999) (arguing for a unitary system).   
134 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 226–29 (critiquing the unitary system and 
advocating for a separate juvenile justice system).  A unitary system is unlikely to provide young 
offenders with programs and services needed to maximize the likelihood that they will make the 
transition to non-criminal adulthood.  The staff, setting, and programs in a separate juvenile system 
are more likely to provide a healthy developmental setting.  See infra notes 146–51 and 
accompanying text. 
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physical violence.  It also supports a regime in which the decision to adjudicate a 
juvenile as an adult is made by a judge in an individualized transfer hearing.135  
Laws adopted in the late twentieth century to redefine the jurisdictional 
boundary between juvenile and criminal court are not compatible with the Court’s 
framework or the constitutional values on which it rests.  During this period, as 
discussed above, statutory reforms greatly expanded the list of transfer-eligible 
crimes to include many non-violent offenses.136  Statistics indicate that about half 
of youths in adult prisons are serving time for property or drug offenses.137  
Moreover, automatic transfer and direct file statutes eliminated any judicial 
determination that adult adjudication is appropriate for particular youths.  These 
laws dramatically shift discretionary authority to make jurisdictional decisions 
from judges to prosecutors who are far less likely to consider youthful immaturity 
or other mitigating circumstances.138  Finally, the general reduction in the 
minimum age of transfer139 has increased the likelihood that immature and less 
culpable youths will face adult prosecution, an outcome that is offensive to the 
constitutional principle of proportionality. 
The Supreme Court’s framework for protecting youths whose crimes and/or 
immaturity do not warrant harsh criminal punishment supports a regulatory 
approach similar to the traditional transfer regime that regulated decisions about 
criminal court adjudication of juveniles in most states for much of the twentieth 
century.140  Under these statutes, transfer typically was limited to older juveniles 
charged with serious violent offenses.  The decision was made by a judge in a 
hearing in which the court considered evidence of immaturity and other factors 
such as the youth’s amenability to treatment as a juvenile, his criminal record, and 
the circumstances of (and his role in) the crime.141  Only on the basis of this 
deliberative process was a juvenile transferred to criminal court to be tried as an 
adult.  This statutory model can guide modern lawmakers in designing a transfer 
process compatible with the constitutional values embedded in the Court’s recent 
juvenile sentencing opinions.  
                                                                                                                            
135 In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court found that juveniles were entitled to a waiver 
hearing before they were transferred to criminal court.  The Court was interpreting the District of 
Columbia statute, but the language of the opinion suggested that the waiver decision implicated 
constitutional interests.  383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
136 For example, in California, youths age fourteen and older can be transferred for thirty 
offenses, including minor drug selling.  CAL. WELF. AND INSTIT. CODE § 707 (West 2011).  
137 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 98. 
138 NAT’L. CENTER FOR JUV. JUST., STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROFILES: NATIONAL OVERVIEWS, 
available at http:www.ncjj.org; TORBET ET AL., supra note 115. 
139 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 345 n.33.  
140 See generally id. at 84 (describing the traditional juvenile court prior to the punitive 
reforms of the 1990s).  
141 See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1006–09 (1995). 
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3. Lesson Three: Juveniles’ Potential to Reform   
 
As discussed above, the Court bolstered its retributive analysis of LWOP as 
an excessive sentence for juveniles with a preventive rationale—that young 
offenders have a greater potential to reform than their adult counterparts and that 
LWOP affords them no opportunity for rehabilitation.142  The importance assigned 
to the potential of youths to desist and reform points to a third important lesson for 
justice policy: as the Court emphasizes, most juveniles who engage in criminal 
activity are not “incorrigible”  (i.e., they are not on an inexorable course to a life of 
criminality).  Their criminal activity is driven by factors associated with 
adolescence as a developmental stage.  As youths mature, these developmental 
influences on decisionmaking diminish and the capacity for self control improves.  
As the Court explained in Miller, “as . . . neurological development occurs, [the 
young offender’s] deficiencies will be reformed.”143  Thus, most juveniles are 
likely to desist from offending as they mature into adulthood144—unless the justice 
system pushes them in the direction of a criminal career.  For this reason, society 
has an interest in responding to juvenile crime through interventions that maximize 
the likelihood that young offenders will actually mature into non-criminal adults.  
An effective justice policy will provide dispositional settings and programs for 
juveniles that promote healthy maturation during adolescence.  
In emphasizing the potential of young criminals to reform as they mature, the 
Court again implicitly rejected policies adopted in the 1990s that aimed to promote 
public safety by incarcerating young criminals in prisons and institutional juvenile 
facilities.  Punitive reformers either did not understand the transitory nature of 
most youthful offending or did not draw the clear policy lesson that correctional 
settings matter if crime reduction is an important goal.  Considerable evidence 
indicates that institutions are harmful developmental settings due to a combination 
of features: large size, impersonal relationships between inmates and adult staff,145 
                                                                                                                            
142 See supra note 73 (explaining the Court’s position that a sentence can be justified as not 
disproportionate if it serves other purposes of criminal punishment such as deterrence, incapacitation, 
or rehabilitation).  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(plurality opinion). 
143 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (internal quotations omitted).  
144 Piquero et. al., supra note 86, at 359 (between five and ten percent become adult career 
criminals). 
145 Staff in prisons and institutional facilities are unlikely to function as positive adult role 
models.  They typically perform custodial functions, maintaining distant, authoritarian, and generally 
hostile relationships with inmates.  Martin Forst, Jeffrey Fagan & T. Scott Vivona, Youths in Prisons 
and Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 JUV. 
& FAM. CT. J. 1 (1989); Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE 
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 227 (Jeffrey Fagan & Frank Zimring eds., 2000) 
(describing staff-inmate relationships in prisons).  
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unstructured interactions with fellow inmates,146 and inadequate educational, 
mental health, and occupational programs.147  These facilities do little to provide 
adolescents with the structures and services necessary to enable them to make the 
transition to the conventional roles of adult life.148  Lawmakers in the late twentieth 
century focused intently on the immediate threat posed by young criminals and 
paid little attention to the long term consequences of imprisonment on juveniles’ 
lives, or perhaps they erroneously assumed that most young offenders were 
incipient career criminals.  Further, the 1990s’ reforms swept into secure facilities 
many youths whose crimes involved no violence and who posed little threat to 
public safety.149  Not surprisingly, recidivism rates among these juveniles were 
(and are) high.150  
Contemporary policy makers have begun to understand that much teenage 
crime is driven by developmental influences, and to embrace the lesson that justice 
policy should attend to juvenile offenders’ potential for reform.  Incarceration-
based policies have been subject to harsh criticism lately because they are costly, 
ineffective at reducing reoffending, and destructive of young offenders’ future 
lives.151  Across the country, regulators have shifted resources from state 
institutions to evidence-based community programs that have been shown to be far 
more effective than institutional placement at reducing reoffending.152  These 
programs incorporate developmental knowledge to create social contexts that 
facilitate healthy maturation in adolescence by seeking to build relationships with 
authoritative parents or other adults, minimize the influence of antisocial peers, 
                                                                                                                            
146 In most adult facilities, youths have frequent contact with older prisoners, who may teach 
them criminal strategies or victimize them.  JAMES AUSTIN, KELLY JOHNSON & MARIA GREGORIOU, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT (2000) 
(juvenile and adult prisoners separated in thirteen percent of facilities).  In some youth prisons, 
juveniles confined for minor crimes mix freely with serious chronic offenders.  CHARTING A NEW 
COURSE, supra note 122, at 19, 47 (describing misdemeanants and violent youths mixed in 
institutional facilities).  
147 Id. at 57–62.   
148 Indeed institutional incarceration may be more aversive for adolescents than for older 
prisoners because teenagers are in a formative developmental stage. 
149 See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFF. OF JUV. DELINQ. PREVENTION, 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT115 (fifty percent of youths in prison 
convicted of property and drug offenses).   
150 CHARTING A NEW COURSE, supra note 122. 
151 Id.  
152 Among the most successful programs are Multi-Systemic Therapy, Functional Family 
Therapy, and Therapeutic Foster Care.  See discussion of these programs, how they function to 
provide healthy social contexts and their effectiveness in SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 215–
21; see also STEVE AOS, MARNA MILLER & ELIZABETH DRAKE, EVIDENCE- BASED PUBLIC POLICY 
OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES 
(2006), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-10-1201.pdf (showing cost effectiveness of 
these programs).  
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and provide appropriate training and educational services.153  Contemporary 
lawmakers increasingly recognize that juveniles have the “potential to reform,” 
and that prison sentences may be counterproductive in furthering society’s goal of 
reducing crime. 
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on the transitory nature of much juvenile 
offending reflects an understanding of youth crime that aligns with (and has 
probably influenced) that of contemporary regulators.  This understanding in turn 
tracks scientific knowledge about the pattern of criminal involvement in 
adolescence and theories about its causes.  Clear policy implications follow from 
the recognition that much youthful offending is driven by developmental 
influences.  The Court has not drawn out these implications through specific policy 
proposals, of course.  But in emphasizing the potential of the young offender to 
reform and rejecting LWOP as offensive to the Eighth Amendment for failing to 
provide that opportunity, while “mak[ing] an irrevocable judgment about that 
person’s value,”154 the Court lent moral authority to a correctional approach that 
assumes that reform is a key policy goal and aims to maximize young criminals’ 
prospects for non-criminal adulthood.  The Court’s endorsement has underscored 
the superiority of this approach and bolstered it as the path forward on both 
pragmatic and moral grounds. 
 
4. Lesson Four: Developmental Science and Juvenile Crime Policy 
 
The last lesson offered by the Court in  the juvenile sentencing  cases overlaps 
with and informs the first three lessons.  The opinions clarify that developmental 
science can play an important role in informing the legal response to youth crime.  
Developmental psychology and neuroscience references were not window dressing 
in the Court’s analysis.  The scientifically informed account of adolescent 
offending is at the heart of its proportionality analysis and it is  the primary basis 
for rejecting the death penalty and LWOP as excessive punishment for juveniles.  
This understanding of juveniles’ involvement in crime also forms the basis of the 
important policy lessons I have described.  But the point can be generalized 
further: the Court’s final lesson is that scientific knowledge about adolescence and 
teenage involvement in crime provides a framework for the formulation of youth 
crime policies that are fair to young offenders and likely to reduce reoffending.  
In grounding its analysis in developmental knowledge, the Court created a 
special status for juveniles in the justice system that rests on a firmer foundation 
than the traditional basis for paternalistic justice policies.  Underscoring this point, 
                                                                                                                            
153 Most successful programs seek to involve delinquents’ parents and to guide them in 
performing their role effectively.  If this is not possible, program staff, teachers, or foster parents, can 
function as adult role models.  SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 215–21 (describing effective 
programs using this approach).  Multi-Systemic Therapy also provides youths with tools to avoid the 
influences of antisocial peers.  Id.  
154 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
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Justice Kagan in Miller emphasized that the Court’s conclusion that juveniles are 
different from adults in ways that are relevant to proportionality was not based on 
conventional wisdom or what “any parent knows,”155 but on a substantial and 
growing body of scientific research.  This announcement confirmed the Court’s 
conviction that in this context, constitutional doctrine can usefully and legitimately 
be informed by scientific knowledge, precisely because developmental research is 
sound and provides insight  relevant to the legal question of whether sanctions that 
are permitted for adult criminals are excessive as applied to juveniles.   
Modern policymakers also increasingly understand that developmental 
psychology and neuroscience research is relevant to the core issues that must be 
addressed in formulating policies that are fair to young offenders and promote 
social welfare.156  Research informs our understanding of the developmental 
factors that contribute to adolescent offending and is beginning to clarify how 
changes in brain structure and functioning may be linked to increased offending in 
early and mid-adolescence and to desistance as teenagers mature.157  Of perhaps 
more direct practical relevance, research on the relationship between social context 
and healthy psychological maturation has contributed to the development of 
programs that can provide youths with the skills and competencies needed to 
negotiate the transition to adult life.158  Policy makers allocating juvenile justice 
resources have also relied on empirical studies evaluating the effectiveness of these 
programs.  Finally, responding to research demonstrating that juveniles are less 
competent to function as defendants in criminal proceedings, lawmakers have 
introduced procedures to reduce the disadvantages of immaturity.159   
In general, there has been substantial movement over the past decade toward 
juvenile crime regulation grounded in scientific knowledge.  Moreover, with the 
growing attention to adolescent brain science, this trend has generated public 
interest and support.  This is not to say that the sole concern of lawmakers or the 
public is to further the welfare of young offenders.  Promoting public safety and 
holding offenders accountable continue to be top priorities of justice policy, and 
                                                                                                                            
155 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).  
156 An important catalyst in promoting the importance of developmental science to justice 
policy was the work of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Research Network on 
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice over a ten year period from 1996 to 2006.  I was a 
member of this Network which, under the leadership of developmental psychologist Laurence 
Steinberg, undertook important research on the competence and culpability of adolescents as 
compared to adults.  In our 2008 book, Steinberg and I offered a developmental framework for 
juvenile justice policy.  See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5.  For a discussion of the 
Network’s contributions, see Robert G. Schwartz, Age-Appropriate Charging and Sentencing, 27 
CRIM. JUST. 49 (Fall 2012). 
157 B.J. Casey, Sarah Getz & Adriana Galvan, The Adolescent Brain, 20 DEV. REV. 62 (2008); 
Bonnie & Scott, supra note 85. 
158 Laurence Steinberg, He Len Chung & Michelle Little, Reentry of Young Offenders from the 
Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, 2 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 21 (2004).  
159 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
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sometimes may override other concerns.  But lawmakers increasingly accept that 
these interests often are furthered most effectively through developmentally based 
policies.  
The account of typical teenage offenders as immature adolescents “whose 
crimes reflect unfortunate but transient immaturity”160 is a far cry from the image 
of remorseless superpredators that prevailed in the 1990s.  The Court’s embrace of 
developmental science signals its rejection of that ominous narrative and its 
commitment to a normative account of adolescence that tracks empirical reality.  
This move is compatible with the inclinations of modern policy makers and 
reinforces an approach to youth crime regulation that has emerged in the early 
twenty-first century. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In a relatively brief period, three Supreme Court opinions have substantially 
expanded Eighth Amendment protections for juveniles convicted as adults of 
serious crimes.  The Court has broken new ground and announced a constitutional 
principle with potentially far reaching implications:  “children are different.”  At 
this point it is not clear whether the Court will apply the principle to further 
enhance juveniles’ special constitutional status.  But it is clear that the Court has 
issued a forceful statement about the differences between adolescent and adult 
criminals and the importance to legal regulation of recognizing those differences.  
This statement and the perspective on juvenile offending embodied in the opinions 
reinforce attitudes emerging in the past decade and are likely to be influential in 
shaping the direction of juvenile crime policy going forward.  In a period in which 
lawmakers are open to rethinking the punitive and costly policies adopted in the 
late twentieth century, the Court has offered several useful lessons that together 
can shape a new wave of law reforms in the twenty-first century.  A legal regime 
that incorporates the Court’s lessons will punish youths less severely than adults, 
individualize transfer decisions, attend to the developmental impact of sanctions, 
and generally draw on scientific knowledge about adolescence to inform 
regulation.  This approach is both fairer to young offenders and more likely to 
reduce the social cost of youth crime than the harsh policies of the 1990s.  
                                                                                                                            
160 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).  
